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Community Cohesion, Communitarianism and Neoliberalism:  
 





This paper seeks to discuss how and why contemporary policy discussions around 
‘Community Cohesion’ have almost completely displaced liberal multiculturalist and 
anti-racist approaches. Hence the basis of fostering the co-existence of communities is 
now a much narrower focus on the promotion of ‘British values’ and, in the case of 
minority communities, through a ‘faith’ agenda. The paper argues that these 
developments derive directly from the predominance of the doctrine of 
communitarianism within both New Labour and Conservative policy circles. The 
authors begin by examining the rise of communitarianism and its manifestations within 
the contemporary policy terrain. The paper then moves to discussing the way 
communitarian policy agendas have converged with neoliberal social and economic 
policy, creating a discourse of ‘conditional citizenship’ for minority communities more 
generally but Muslim communities in particular.  This is caused by the way faith based 
approaches are encouraged on one hand, but in the context of transnational Islamist 
terror, allow these same communities to be primarily identified with concerns around 
‘security’ and ‘radicalisation’. The paper discusses the ‘Trojan Horse Schools’ affair in 
Birmingham in 2014 as an example of this.  We conclude by arguing that this policy 
convergence has created the context for divisive and dangerous moral panics about 
Muslims and their apparent inability to accept ‘British values’.  In response, it is argued 
that there is an urgent to refocus the debate toward secular approaches in policy, 
alongside looking at the specific economic and social conditions that are the root cause 
of breakdowns in community cohesion.  
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Though many areas of social policy are contested along ideological lines, there are few 
people who would disagree that building a cohesive society is critical policy area for 
any government. However, if there is consensus on the importance of social cohesion, 
this is not the case when it comes to questions related to the causes of social in-cohesion 
and policy options that follow for building a cohesive society. Addressing this question 
in a speech in the ethnically diverse area of Lozells in Birmingham on January 2007, 
former British Conservative leader David Cameron asserted that community cohesion 
was: 
 
...not a new challenge for our country [but]...a question that is as old as humanity 
itself: how do we live together.  Throughout our history, there have been 
moments when that question has become more important, when people from 
other parts of the world have come to this country and made it their home. Each 
time, over time, we have found the answer to the question of how we live 
together. We have kept our country together, and we have moved forward 
together by having faith in the things which make Britain great. And there’s 
something else we need to remember. When there have been tensions, when 
things threaten to divide us, we’ve always reacted in a very British way.  We 
haven’t been hysterical.  We haven’t lost sight of the British way of doing 
things. We’ve been calm, and thoughtful, and reasonable.  That is the British 
way, and that’s the way we should face the challenge of this moment, today. 
(Cameron, 2007). 
 
How has it come to be that this invocation of ‘the British way of doing things’ has 
become so important? Many commentators have noted the shift to a new policy 
common-sense from the early noughties onwards whereby Britain was seen to have 
moved ‘too far’ in the direction of multiculturalism for the collective good (see for e.g. 
Shukra et al. 2004; Kundnani, 2007; McGhee, 2008; Cowden & Singh, 2011).  The 
2001 riots in the northern mill towns of Bradford, Burnley and Oldham and the 
subsequent report by Ted Cantle on ‘Community Cohesion’ (2001), offered the 
rationale for this turn, with Trevor Philips, then head of the Commission for Race 
Equality, providing additional legitimacy with his own claim that multiculturalism had 
come to ‘suggest separateness’ (Shukra et al. 2004:187).  Alongside this new language 
of cohesion came, as Cameron’s speech above demonstrates, a new language of 
‘nation’. This was not so much a regression to an old style imperial triumphalism, but 
rather one which offered acceptance to diverse groups on the condition of being able to 
demonstrate the embrace of ‘British values’.   
 
As the language of ‘liberal multiculturalism’ (Parekh, 2002) has waned over the past 
15 years, a new compact has developed in the policy landscape between ‘British values’ 
and the discourse of ‘community cohesion’. One of the main effects of this is to have 
legitimised concerns about the impact of immigration, which went on to become a 
major theme in the UK General Election in 2014 and to an even greater extent in the 
EU Referendum of 2016. These concerns were expressed most blatantly in the 
stridently regressive nationalism of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), but both of 
these events were marked by the lack of leading political figures, despite the 
overwhelming evidence, being prepared to make a positive case for immigration.  As 
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Kieran Tharper argues, following ‘decades of simmering instability’, the denouncement 
of ‘multiculturalism as an unrealistic cosmopolitan ideal’ suggests that ‘a stubborn gut 
feeling in the less tolerant side of the British psyche’ continues to bubble ‘beneath the 
surface’ (Tharpar, 2014), a point which has only been emphasised further by the 
language of the ‘Leave’ campaign in the 2016 EU referendum.  In this paper we want 
to consider the way in which contemporary political currents are fuelling new and 
potentially extremely destabilising moral panics about migrants, foreigners, the 
economy and Britishness.  In particular, we argue that the shift in political discourse 
away from liberal multiculturalism toward a language of ‘social and community 
cohesion’ laced with a neoliberal logic, has created a dangerously divisive polity, and 
that those who have promoted this policy have no idea of how to solve the problems 
they have themselves created.  
 
A key starting point in terms of considering the problems with the policy discourse of 
‘social cohesion’ lies in the things that are not referred to. Here we are specifically 
referring to ongoing rise in poverty and social inequalities, which are a consequence of 
the relentless pursuit of neoliberal market-based social and economic policies.  Not only 
have these stripped away the welfare and support services on which the most vulnerable 
populations - women, minorities, disabled people, displaced people - rely, but as Pierre 
Bourdieu has argued, represent a ‘mode of production...based on the institution of 
insecurity’, as a deregulated financial market fosters an increasingly casualised labour 
market (2001:29). Anxieties about cohesion swim in a sea of material insecurity.  A 
2014 report by charity Oxfam entitled Working for the Few (2014) demonstrated this 
with the astonishing figure that ‘almost half of the world’s wealth is now owned by just 
one percent of the population’, while the ‘bottom half of the world’s population owns 
the same as the richest 85 people in the world’:  
 
The massive concentration of economic resources in the hands of fewer people 
presents a significant threat to inclusive political and economic systems. Instead 
of moving forward together, people are increasingly separated by economic and 
political power, inevitably heightening social tensions and increasing the risk of 
societal breakdown (2014:3) 
 
While there is some limited policy discussion of the consequences of poverty for the 
‘White Working Class’ (see for e.g. House of Commons Education Committee, 2014), 
when this involves ethnic minority communities it is addressed not as an issue of 
inequality or discrimination, but in terms of the relationship between ‘cohesion’ and 
‘faith’.  The role of ‘faith’ comes to be pivotal when discussing Muslim communities 
particularly, not just because it is seen to define these communities, but because it also 
comes to be seen as the primary source of cohesion within these communities.  
However, in the context of ongoing transnational Islamist terrorism, this same set of 
enthusiasms rapidly flips over into an acute anxiety about ‘radicalisation’ and 
‘security’.  There is a thus a curious double movement where on one hand faith is held 
up by politicians, policy makers and religious leaders themselves as a great and positive 
force in the promotion of social cohesion.  But as ongoing revelations of ‘jihadi brides’ 
and Asian youth travelling to Syria to join ISIS continue to hit the headlines, the 
prominence of Islam comes to be seen as evidence of how these communities are 
insufficiently ‘British’ and thus a source of social in-cohesion.  In public life, Muslims 
now have to justify themselves, and it is this results in what Van Houdt, Suvarierol & 
Schinkel (2011) describe as ‘conditional or earned citizenship’.   
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This paper aims to unravel the process by which we have come to this strange and 
dangerous place.  We begin by identifying the ideology of communitarianism as the 
key source of these policy shifts.  We argue that the displacement of liberal 
multiculturalism as a discourse of citizenship by the concept of social cohesion has 
arisen as a result of the influence of communitarian thinking.  We then go on to discuss 
the way this narrative, problematic in itself, has been overlaid by the rise of 
transnational Islamist terror.  We argue that this is a phenomena which needs to be 
understood as a distinctive form of reactionary politico-religious mobilisation (Cowden 
& Singh, 2011).  However within the ‘British values’ based communitarian paradigm, 
this comes to be understood as a problem of British Muslim communities being 
insufficiently ‘British’.  This is a construction which ends up reproducing the very form 
of ‘othering’ it claims to want to avoid, while at the same time being silent on the 
material causes of social dislocation and insecurity, which we situate in neoliberal 
economic policies.  We conclude the paper by discussing the 2014 ‘Trojan Horse 
Schools’ affair in Birmingham as a manifestation of this convergence. 
 
 
Communitarianism and the neo-liberal state 
 
Margaret Thatcher’s claims that there is ‘no such thing as society’ has often been 
represented as the sin qua non of neoliberal social policy, and in seeking to characterise 
‘the march of the neoliberals’ Stuart Hall has argued that: 
 
Neoliberalism is grounded in the "free, possessive individual", with the state 
cast as tyrannical and oppressive. The welfare state, in particular, is the arch 
enemy of freedom. The state must never govern society, dictate to free 
individuals how to dispose of their private property, regulate a free-market 
economy or interfere with the God-given right to make profits and amass 
personal wealth. State-led "social engineering" must never prevail over 
corporate and private interests. It must not intervene in the "natural" 
mechanisms of the free market, or take as its objective the amelioration of free-
market capitalism's propensity to create inequality (Hall, 2011)  
 
While Hall’s characterisation of the individualism that dominates neoliberal thinking 
captures an essential aspect of this, it would be a mistake to see this as expressing the 
limits of neoliberal thinking.  Indeed, many advocates of neoliberal economic and social 
policy, have expressed concerns about both the possibility and actuality of social 
breakdown and disorder resulting from the unleashing of market forces.  Tony Blair 
and New Labour could be seen as the prime example of this and their attempt to 
synthesise neoliberal economic and social policy with a concern with ‘community’, 
‘values’ and questions about the nature of social bonds needs to be understood as a 
distinctive development of neoliberal thinking in its own right.  The significance of this 
influence was demonstrated by the extent to which the Conservatives under David 
Cameron sought to emulate this approach.  More recently the new Conservative Prime 
Minister, Theresa May in her first statement as Prime Minister extolled the virtues of 
‘one-nation government’ and played heavily on the theme of social exclusion and 
inequalities (May, 2016), though not unsurprisingly without mention of the failings of 
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neoliberal policy or the dramatic increase in hate crime in the wake of the Brexit vote 
1.  
 
The origins of communitarianism lie in the work of the classical sociologist Ferdinand 
Tönnies and his hugely influential text Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (1887), 
generally translated in English as ‘Community and Civil Society’ (2001). Tönnies was 
interested in understanding the nature of the social ties that bound people together in a 
period of emergent capitalism.  He saw the social ties located in personal face-to-face 
relationships and social interactions as the moral basis of community life 
(Gemeinschaft), counterposing these to the formal rules of society (Gesellschaft), 
typified by modern, cosmopolitan societies where social relationships were impersonal 
and often conducted through indirect forms of interaction in the form of state 
bureaucracy or large industrial organizations. While Tönnies saw himself as politically 
on the Left, his essentially negative characterisation of the way traditional bonds of 
family, community and religion were being displaced by more impersonal societal 
forces contained within it a deep vein of backward looking romanticism (Bond 2013).  
It is this essentially romantic conception of the ‘traditional community’ that 
communitarianism aims to reconstruct in our own time. 
 
The founder of contemporary communitarianism is the Israeli-American sociologist 
Amatai Etzioni.  Etzioni, who describes his work as the direct descendant of Tönnies, 
argues for a social policy based on the idea that ‘much social conduct is, and that more 
ought to be, sustained and guided by the informal web of social bonds and by the moral 
voices of the community’ (Etzioni, 1998: xii).  Summarising the broad range of thought 
associated with this view, Daniel Sage argues that the starting point for 
communitarianism is acceptance of a theory of the self as an inherently social entity 
which is born into group identities and thus a strong desire for community. It follows 
that ‘if humans are intrinsically social, then desirable goods will flow from strong 
communities’ (Sage, 2012:367). Strong communities help to prevent social isolation 
and alienation and therefore become the basis upon which social stability and cohesion 
are to be promoted. It follows that the social policy approach from a communitarian 
perspective, as Driver and Martell (1997: 29) argue, is one that ‘recognizes the 
embeddedness and interdependence of human life, and promotes social and civic values 
above individual ones.’ Communitarianism thus presents itself as an alternative to both 
a state dominated Fabian social democracy on one hand and classical liberal-
individualist conceptions of society on the other.  In the face of contemporary social 
breakdown, rather than an ever-increasing volume of allegedly ‘ineffective’ forms of 
state intervention, what is needed instead is the facilitation and development of the 
‘moral bonds of community’ (Etzioni, 1998: xii-xiii).  
 
Sage has argued that communitarianism was attractive to Blair and New Labour as it 
offered a ‘third way’ between the individualism of the Thatcherite free market but 
which did not involve ‘resorting to the statist arguments of the old left’ (Sage, 2012: 
368).  Etzioni himself has cited Tony Blair as a promulgator of his programme (Etzioni, 
1998: x) with Blair returning the compliment (Guardian, 12/1/2006). However, it was 
                                                 
1 This rise was described by Mark Hamilton, head of the National Police Chief’s 
Council (NPCC) as ‘the worst spike’ in hate crime where “some people took it as a 
licence to behave in a racist or other discriminatory way” (Guardian, 11/7/2016) 
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only after the 2001 riots involving Asian youth in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 
Blair’s second term of office that this language became so central to New Labour, with 
the riots offering the evidence on which this policy turn was based.  The Cantle Report 
(Cantle, 2001), commissioned by Home Office Minister David Blunkett to investigate 
the causes of the riots, does not contain any reference communitarian ideas as such.  
However, as David Robinson has noted, the diagnosis of the causes of the riots - ethnic 
segregation, limited cross-cultural interaction and an absence of shared identity and 
values between groups – reproduced the theme of the erosion of community life which 
is so central to communitarian approaches (2008: 16-17).      
  
The ongoing significance of the communitarian agenda is further demonstrated by the 
way, having been placed on the policy agenda by New Labour, the Conservatives felt 
the need to have their own communitarian philosopher-king, a role played by the ‘Red 
Tory’ Anglo-Catholic philosopher Philip Blond.  His 2010 book Red Tory: How Left 
and Right Have Broken Britain and How We Can Fix It sought to define the basis of 
social breakdown in very similar terms to Etzioni but with a far more conservative 
attack on Fabian social welfare: 
 
the state, instead of augmenting the social world as it was, nationalised a 
previously mutual society and reformed it according to an individualised culture 
of universal entitlement. Dispensing resources and services became a 
managerial task founded on a centralised and utilitarian account of need, rather 
than a locally specified service that could establish mutual and reciprocal 
arrangements better suited to the needs of recipients and their communities. The 
citizenry was treated as a homogenous mass to be serviced, rather than a diverse 
web to be entangled. (2010: 282) 
 
The romantic harking back to the world of Gemeinschaft is even more pronounced in 
Blond’s praise of the ‘medieval network of a predominantly horizontal communal and 
social order, exemplified by the church but also including guilds and agrarian 
communities organised around differential property relationships (Blond, 2008). While 
the latter has not quite made the Conservative Party manifesto, Blond was closely 
involved as an advisor to the Conservatives (Mail Online 9/8/2009) in their first term 
of office in coalition with the Liberal Democrats. Many commentators have noted his 
influence on Conservative strategist Steve Hilton, a close ally of David Cameron during 
this period.  The ‘Big Society’ initiative was the brainchild of Hilton and represented 
perhaps the high point of Conservative communitarian thinking (Sage, 2012, Corbett & 
Walker, 2013).  Many commentators have noted the decline of this initiative in the 
second term of David Cameron’s administration, and Caroline Slocock has suggested 
that this is an ironic consequence of the impact of austerity on the charitable and 
voluntary sector (Slocock, 2015), expected to the take over from state provided 
services.  However, the fundamental continuity throughout all of these changes in 
Conservative policy and personnel lies in the focus on the binding moral force of 
‘British values’.   
 
Another significant manifestation of the communitarian tendency was ‘Blue Labour’.  
This developed out of the thinking of a grouping of Labour MPs and intellectuals 
concerned with revitalising social democratic thinking following the Labour defeat in 
the 2010 General Election.  Key figures in the group were Lord Maurice Glasman, 
Labour intellectuals such as Jonathan Rutherford, Stuart White and Marc Stears and 
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MP John Cruddas, seen as being on the left of Labour, and James Purnell, from the 
Blairite wing of the party.  A key concern of Glasman’s work is his critique of the way 
Fabian state managed welfare, driven by science and professional expertise, has 
displaced those alternative forms of socialism based on self-organised mutuality and 
co-operation (Glasman, 2011:15).  He has argued for a return to those aspects of the 
socialist tradition ‘that place reciprocity, association and organisation as fundamental 
aspects of building a common life’ (ibid: 34).  In a similar vein, Jonathon Rutherford 
argued that ‘without the shared meanings of a common life, there is no basis for living 
a life of one’s own’ (2011: 90).  Despite the way both Blue Labour and Red Tory shared 
the critique of the bureaucratic rationalist State, Blue Labour was distinct from the latter 
in seeing the threat to ‘social relations and community togetherness also emerging from 
the disruptive forces of the free market, while building a state which helps support and 
foster social goods’ (Sage, 2012:373).  The Blue Labour tendency had a significant 
influence on Ed Miliband during the period of his leadership of the Labour party, 
however the defeat of Labour in 2015 and subsequent election of Jeremy Corbyn as 
party leader appear to have eclipsed this grouping, at least for the moment.   
 
What we have sought to characterise so far is the extent of the communitarian turn, and 
the way this has come to represent a new common-sense at the policy level.  We noted 
earlier that this shift was accompanied, in both New Labour and Conservative 
administrations, with a deep commitment to neoliberal free market economics.  It is 
necessary to say something more at this stage about the way this two fit together as we 
believe this is crucial in understanding the present situation.  Our argument is that 
despite the apparent opposition of these approaches – the neoliberal focus on the ‘free 
possessive individual’ versus communitarian ideal of ‘communal moral bonds’ - both 
doctrines share crucially significant ground.  Firstly, both are ideologically anti-statist 
in the sense that they regard state intervention and state welfare as having ‘failed’.  This 
of course remains an ideological position as in practice the state remains strong as a 
means of upholding the status quo in power relations.   The second key area of 
convergence which lies in the way both situate the notion of ‘responsibilisation’ at the 
core of social policy. Whether this concerns the neoliberal notion that ‘individuals and 
individual choices [lie at] the heart of social problems’ (Bochel, 2011: 21) or the focus 
on the ‘moral bonds of community’ in communitarianism, at the core of both doctrines 
is the expectation that people need to ‘take responsibility’ for their predicaments and 
difficulties.  As Dhaliwal and Patel have noted, this allows social breakdown to be 
reframed as essentially a problem of ‘interpersonal interactions and values’; allowing 
questions of material inequalities and state power to be displaced from the policy 
discourse (Dhaliwal and Patel, 2012:176).    
 
Van Houdt, Suvarierol and Schinkel (2011) have developed this discussion further by 
pointing to what could be seen as a third important key terrain focussed on the question 
of citizenship.  They argue that the social democratic conception of citizenship was as 
a set of ‘prima facie rights’.  With the rise of communitarian paradigms, this moves 
away from positive rights toward a conception of citizenship as ‘a prized possession 
that is to be earned and can be lost if not properly cultivated’ (2011:408).  It is in this 
sense of citizenship that these authors identify a key convergence of the two discourses, 
characterising ‘neoliberal communitarianism’ as a strategy for ‘managing citizenship’.  
Individuals now need to earn membership of the nation-state through demonstrating 
understanding and adherence to ‘cultural and moral criteria’, understood as core 
expressions of national identity. The communitarian underpinnings of ‘earned 
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citizenship’ are manifest in this demand to demonstrate loyalty to dominant community 
values, as well as in creating an ideal image of the active citizen and the contributions 
they are expected to make to society (2011:416).    
 
Multiculturalism in this sense can be understood as a social democratic response to 
black and anti-racist mobilisation as in it occurred in the UK in the 1970-80s and for 
all the problems with the ‘saris, somasas and steel drums’ approach, there was a 
language of rights and justice that has been lost in the communitarian discourse of 
‘British values’, which now runs throughout UK social policy.  The Cantle Report 
initiated this shift in the way it entirely passed over the material realities of industrial 
decline, ‘white flight’ and institutional racism (Kundnani 2007:123), locating the 
problems at the level of the decline of ‘shared values’.  Cantle’s first recommendation 
(from a total of 70) typified this, calling for the ‘rights and responsibilities of citizenship 
to be formalised into statement of allegiance’ (Cantle, 2001:46).  Citizenship 
ceremonies for newly arrived migrants to the UK now include these very declarations 
of allegiance to the British state and monarch.  Similarly running through the counter-
terrorism strategy PREVENT, presently incorporated into the curriculum of all UK 
secondary schools, is the definition of extremism as ‘vocal or active opposition to 
fundamental British values such as democracy, the rule of law and tolerance of different 
faiths and beliefs’ (Prevent Parent Leaflet, 2015).  The problem with this lies in the way 
it assumes a consensus on these issues, at the same time as failing to actually ask what 
it is that needs to be ‘prevented’.   
 
We would characterise the Islamic fundamentalist movements that are the primary 
object of concern here as politico-religious movements which ‘construct a single 
version of collective identity as the only true, authentic and valid one, and use it to 
impose their power and authority over ‘their’ constituency’ (Imam, Morgan & Yuval-
Davis, 2004:x). However, by suggesting that the primary problem with Islamic 
Fundamentalism is that it is not ‘British’, we entirely lose the reality, powerfully 
captured by writers such as Karima Bennoune, that the main victims of this 
authoritarianism are Muslims themselves, primarily women. It is also the case that 
Muslims constitute a significant component of the resistance to this fundamentalism 
(Bennoune, 2013).  While PREVENT decontextualises the issue of what 
fundamentalism actually represents politically, so it does equally with the question of 
‘British values’.  While democracy, the rule of law and tolerance are undoubtedly 
important, it is not clear how these are specifically ‘British’; they could be considered 
to be universal democratic norms.  We might also ask how were such values expressed 
in the transatlantic slave trade or the colonisation of indigenous peoples in Australia 
and North America? Equally how do we understand the closeness of the alliance 
between Britain and Saudi Arabia, whose state has globally sponsored the violently 
puritanical Wahhabi ideology which has provided the ‘fertile soil in which extremism 
can flourish’ (Armstrong; 2015).   But these difficult questions are now to be swept 
under the carpet as we are all required, as David Cameron puts it, to have ‘faith in the 
things which make Britain great’ (Cameron, 2007).  
 
Faith and Community Cohesion 
 
As we have argued elsewhere (Cowden & Singh, 2015) in a context where there is seen 
to be ‘no alternative’ to the mantra of global competition, and state based welfare and 
social protection systems are being dismantled, a new social imaginary of the 
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‘functional’ and ‘dysfunctional’ individuals and communities has emerged.  This 
strategy of ‘conditional and earned citizenship’, manifest through a continuous focus in 
both the media and in government policy on the need for people need to ‘take 
responsibility’ for their lives, allows the structural dimensions of people’s life situations 
to be conjured out of existence within the political imaginary. This discourse of ‘good’ 
functional communities and dysfunctional ‘others’ was most clearly played out in the 
official responses to the 2001 riots in northern England.  The then Prime Minister Tony 
Blair spoke of these as being essentially about ‘thuggery’ and criminal acts.  This 
narrative was further reinforced by some Asian ‘community leaders’ who publicly 
denounced the young rioters as lacking discipline and exhibiting ‘the effects of 
westernisation and a decline in traditional Muslim values’ (Kundnani, 2007).  This was 
a significant moment for pointing the way in which the state could enlist communities 
of ‘faith’ as offering a potential solution to the erosion of the moral bonds of community 
discussed earlier, while at the same not reverting to the ‘state multiculturalism’ which 
was being denounced as a cause of social segregation.  Dhaliwal and Patel (2012) have 
noted that such sentiments reflected part of an overall policy shift where 
‘multiculturalism’ morphed in ‘multi-faithism’; representing the consolidation of 
religious organisations in public policy, even though this was often expressed in non-
religious language concerning the reconstruction of ‘the social’ (Dhaliwal & Patel, ibid: 
174).  The New Labour years bore witness to the state enthusiastically welcoming faith 
based groups as offering Social Capital (Halpern, 2005) and a vital contribution to 
questions of citizenship and cohesion.  In June 2008 Malcolm Duncan, head of an 
influential new Christian think-tank ‘Faithworks’ was invited by then PM Gordon 
Brown to 10 Downing Street, where Duncan asserted that: 
 
People of faith are making a vital contribution to the United Kingdom. It is 
impossible to talk about community cohesion, joined up service delivery or 
strong and sustainable partnerships without understanding this (Sanderson, 
2008).   
 
The Conservatives ‘Big Society’ initiative also had a significant ‘faith’ dimension.  In 
2010 the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government Eric Pickles met 
with the Archbishops of Westminster and Canterbury and claimed that while ‘some see 
religion as a problem that needs to be solved; the new Government sees it as part of the 
solution’ (gov.uk, 19th July, 2010).  Possibly not wanting to be outdone, the then 
Chairman of the Conservative Party Baroness Sayeeda Warsi made her own claim that: 
 
. . . if anyone suggests that this government does not understand, does not 
appreciate, does not defend people of faith, dare I even say, does not ‘do God’, 
then I hope my schedule this week will go some way to banishing that myth. 
(BBC News, 2010) 
 
Discussing New Labour’s promotion of ‘faith schools’ Gamarnikow and Green have 
pointed to the way this policy involves a ‘curious sleight of hand which turns the faith 
ethos of faith schools, their sacred distinctiveness, into a marker of profane, market-
oriented educational desirability’ (2005: 26).  Our argument follows similarly lines to 
this; where the profane objective of community cohesion has landed upon 
‘communities of faith’ as the ideal means of delivering this agenda.  The argument 
presented here is that this derives directly out of the communitarian narratives.  There 
are a number of significant problems with this which have very specific implications 
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for women, and particular women within black and minority ethnic (BME) 
communities.  Firstly, the communitarian approach offers an entirely uncritical sense 
of faith communities as essentially benign. Such an approach is completely silent on 
the historical, ideological and material conditions in which religious identities and the 
social relations, which accompany them, are being produced, asserted and in many 
cases imposed.  Chetan Bhatt has argued that this inability to talk about the ‘will to 
power’ inherent in the rise of religious identification is made possible through what he 
calls a ‘mesmerising culturalism’ which allows the suspension of ethical judgement 
regarding religious organisation and mobilisation (Bhatt, 2006: 99).  Similarly, 
Dhaliwal and Patel have argued that many religious movements within minority 
communities present themselves as  
 
...subjected to racist structural discrimination, and locate their concerns within 
narratives about racialisation.  This enables religious right formations to locate 
themselves within spaces of left and human rights activism.  In turn women’s 
and LGBT concerns are either marginalised or obscured from view (ibid: 173)  
 
Faith community leaders in BME communities, who are almost entirely male, come to 
occupy a pivotal role in the interface with the state; as they are seen to be spokespeople 
for the religiously defined concerns of these communities, and additionally because 
they lead the organisations that are thought of as maintaining cohesion within these 
communities.  But is there any real evidence for these assumptions?  David Robinson 
noted in relation to Cantle’s report on the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and 
Oldham that there was really no substantial evidence to justify the adoption of ‘cultural 
explanations’ over consideration of ‘wider structural processes’ (Robinson, 2008:260).  
In a similar vein Dhaliwal and Patel have described a major study carried out by 
Southall Black Sisters into the religious identification of women of Hindu, Sikh and 
Muslim who have used their services in Southall in West London (ibid:181-184).  They 
note regarding their findings that: 
 
When asked to think of measures, which would promote social cohesion, every 
woman spoke of equality, respect and positive appreciation of difference.  None 
asked for a greater role for religion or faith-based groups in public life.  In fact, 
every single woman was firmly against the proliferation of faith-based schools 
or faith-based laws and institutions as they believed such developments would 
have a divisive and detrimental upon future society (ibid: 184)  
         
Community based research like this is revealing for the way it offers such a definitive 
rebuttal of the cultural-communitarian orthodoxy which dominates the policy horizon 
in the UK.  The findings also demonstrate the respondents’ prescience in anticipating 
the divisive nature of the extension of faith based initiatives since this was exactly what 
was played out in Birmingham in 2014 in what was known the ‘Trojan Horse Schools’ 
Affair.   
 
The ‘Trojan Horse Schools’ affair originated in a memo, leaked to the press in March 
2014, which described an organised attempt by Salafist groupings to gain control over 
a series of schools in Asian areas of the city and introduce an ultra-conservative form 
of Sunni Islam into these.  One of the alleged authors of these documents was Tahir 
Alam, who was at that stage Director of the Park View Educational Trust, an Academy 
Chain which ran three schools in Birmingham, but who had previously been chair of 
 11 
the Muslim Council of Britain’s (MCB) Education Committee where he was the co-
author of a document concerned with how schools should engage with a Muslim faith 
ethos.  What was most revealing in the whole affair was the way in which the positive 
belief in the value of involving religious bodies in education so easily flipped over into 
concern with radicalisation and extremism.  Following allegations by Ofsted chief 
Michael Wilshaw that teachers and school governors who opposed this agenda were 
being intimidated from speaking out, then Education Secretary Michael Gove 
appointed Peter Clarke, the former head of the Metropolitan police's counterterrorism 
command to investigate; again the choice of an investigator with a background in 
counterterrorism rather than education further demonstrates the contradictions on 
governmental thinking.  While the letter which sparked the affair was subsequently 
found to be a forgery and Clarke himself found that there was ‘no evidence to suggest 
that there is a problem with governance generally’ nor any ‘evidence of terrorism, 
radicalisation or violent extremism in the schools of concern in Birmingham’, he 
nonetheless saw significant evidence of attempts to impose Salafist principles in the 
schools which he investigated, describing an ‘intolerant Islamist approach that denies 
the validity of alternative beliefs, lifestyles and value systems, including within Islam 
itself’ (Clarke, 2014).  Despite the media feeding frenzy around issues of terrorism, 
what completely disappeared in media and government accounts were the educational 
and pedagogical implications of this puritanical form of religious fundamentalism, not 
least in the limitations placed on girls, as well as in attitudes to LGBT pupils and staff.  
Evidence concerning Adderly school in Saltley showed examples which were typical 
of the way fundamentalist religious groups operate, as Salafist parents, working 
alongside staff who shared their views, sought to impose their politico-religious dogma 
on the rest of the school community through complaining and objecting to what they 
called impure and ‘non-Islamic’ elements in the children’s education.  A school 
governor at Adderly, Kadir Arif, described the way these parents attacked the school 
and its board of governors over things such as celebrations of Christmas, Easter and 
Diwali, as well as mixed swimming classes (Birmingham Mail, December 2015).        
 
What also remained hidden in this media driven hysteria was the way the opportunity 
for religious fundamentalists to push their agenda in the schools was provided by 
government policy itself. The Conservatives’ academy programme welcomed 
organisations like the Park View Academy Trust to take over schools from Local 
Authorities as a part of their agenda of ‘raising standards’; in effect this is a programme 
to steadily privatise the secondary education system.  It is important to remember that 
businessman Tahir Alam’s Park View Educational Trust would have been approved by 
the Local and Central government as part of this agenda, and there is no doubt that it 
would have been seen as entirely appropriate that the promotion of the Islamic faith in 
this schools would have been seen as a contribution to the problem of social cohesion 
in those economically deprived areas of Birmingham.   This created the space for 
organised Salafist parents and staff to challenge multi-faith celebrations and push for 
segregation of classes along the lines of religion and gender.  For all the bizarrely 
conspiratorial aspect of the Trojan Horse schools’ affair, it did demonstrate the extent 
of staff and parental objection to this.   However once the schools became the focus of 
a media driven moral panic, it was the ‘Muslim’ nature of the schools which came to 
be seen as the problem, rather than the specific impact of fundamentalism as such, and 
the reasons why inclusive and secular approaches had been displaced.  Just as in the 
PREVENT policy, the whole question of what fundamentalism actually is was lost in 
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the wider message that Muslims as a whole are insufficiently ‘British’, fuelling fear, 
suspicion and racist violence.   
 
It is clear from our discussion so far that we believe one of the fundamental problems 
in this area lies in the way Muslim communities and societies are seen as an 
undiffentiated whole, and one that is often in thrall to fundamentalism.  Yet the 
opposition that Salafist parents and staff provoked in Birmingham demonstrates how 
this was not the case.  Given this we feel it is particularly problematic that some 
academics have sought to characterise these issues fundamentally as an expression of 
‘Islamaphobia’. The work of sociologist David Miller et al (2015) is an example of this, 
arguing that ‘we need to understand that it is the state itself and its machinery of 
surveillance and repression that is at the forefront of ensuring that Muslims are 
collectively pushed to the edge of public life’ (2015 3/3).  While there is no denying 
the intensity of racism being targeted at Muslim communities at the moment, we would 
strongly reject the idea that these conflicts can be characterised simplistically as 
expressions of ‘Islamaphobia’.  Firstly, the term assumes a single Islam which is being 
persecuted by the British state and media.  Our reading of the Trojan horse affair is of 
a conflict between different versions of Islam; where fundamentalist Salafist ideas were 
opposed by other Muslims.  The role of the state, rather than being persecutory of 
‘Islam’ or ‘pushing Muslims to the edge of public life’, demonstrates rather the way 
conservative religious groups and institutions are taking the opportunities offered by 
neoliberal policies, such as those concerning ‘faith schools’ or the Conservatives 
programme of Academicisation.  Indeed, the stated intention of the latter is to remove 
schools from the ‘bureaucracy’ of Local Education Authorities, which crucially 
includes equalities provision which would prevent gender and religious segregation.   
 
In a broader sense we would argue, following Yuval-Davis (2014) that the term 
‘Islamaphobia’ confuses the issues by conflating legitimate criticism of religious 
arguments and institutions with hate and hate crime.  We also feel the that the concept 
of ‘Islamaphobia’, which literally translates as ‘hatred or dislike of Islam’, is simply 
inadequate to make sense of the profound and multiple tensions which Muslim 
communities are experiencing, which are based in complex historical and economic 
processes, such as de-industrialisation and changes in patterns of migration, work and 
family structure.  We would also argue definitively that at the root of moral panics like 
the ‘Trojan Horse Schools’ affair are the contradictions of state policy.  For all the 
inadequacies of Clarke’s report on the Trojan Horse Schools affair it is revealing in the 
way he showed how many Muslim parents did not want their children’s education 
dominated by the sort of puritanical faith ethos that was present in many of the schools 
investigated (Clarke, 2014); yet it was this divisive policy that was imposed on them, 
and following revelations about this, the entire community was pathologised. It is in 
this way that the largely secular aspirations of Asian communities wanting a decent life 
for themselves and their children remain trapped within and then punished by the policy 




We are increasingly witnessing an alarming rise in attacks on migrants and minorities 
of all faiths across the globe, alongside increasing violence against women, often 
religiously inspired or justified. Furthermore, as a reaction to the combination of 
increasing social insecurity institutionalised by neoliberal economic policy and ongoing 
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Islamist terrorism, we are seeing the increasing popularity of a right wing nationalist 
politics blaming migrants for economic problems and asserting the incompatibility of 
Muslims, many of whom have lived in Europe for 2-3 decades, within a ‘European’ 
polity. We have argued that a state that seeks to value ‘difference’ and facilitate 
integration is certainly more desirable than one that functions to ignore or worst still 
obliterate minority cultural identities, but we also think that if you want this cohesion, 
it is crucial to ask the more fundamental question of what it is that divides people.  
 
The argument we have presented in this paper concerns the way mainstream political 
parties of the left and right have converged not just around the logic of neoliberalism, 
but equally in the embrace of communitarianism.  As the social consequences of 
inequality and insecurity become increasing apparent, the latter offers the 
Conservatives a crucial legitimation device, demonstrated by their ongoing 
commitment to ‘one-nation Conservatism’ and the appeal to ‘British values’.  However 
for the parties of the left who are seeking reclaim an agenda of integration and cohesion, 
it appears to us that there is an urgent need to move beyond the preoccupation with 
cultural and religious identities and start talking about the material realities of poverty, 
unemployment, gendered violence, and the need to fight for secure working conditions, 
decent healthcare and inclusive public education.  In order to achieve this, the left 
desperately needs to recover a language of universality (Assister, 2016), of democratic 
rights and of the politics of secularism. The latter must not be an anti-religious 
programme, but rather needs to be about separating the right to personal beliefs from a 
public sphere that must be an inclusive space.  Without such a secular agenda, we 
remain trapped within divisive faith based approaches, which while benefiting 
patriarchal religious leaderships, situate the very communities they claim to speak for 
as disinclined to integrate in ‘British ways’, and thus as victims of moral panics and 
hate crime. This is a process which has displaced social justice and rights based 
approaches, and it is crucial that these are brought back onto the agenda. The 
development of this has to be part of an approach which poses an alternative to the 
ongoing manufacture of insecurity across the board, with a focus onto the specific 
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